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ABSTRACT
The number of international schools has increased significantly this 
century, with new schools predominately situated in Asia and the 
Middle East. This growth has also seen a shift from not-for-profit to 
for-profit education, and from such schools being primarily for 
children of expatriates to being mainly for host nation children. 
New actors, such as global chains of international schools, have also 
entered the arena. This article explores the impact of the contem-
porary landscape on the professional relationship between interna-
tional school principals and their governors/owners, by drawing on 
a study of 12 international school principals in Malaysia. There were 
five emergent themes from the analysis: principal autonomy; own-
ership support; principal accountability; principal affective disso-
nance and the locus of control. There were wide-ranging levels of 
autonomy given to principals, significant support from owners in 
terms of financial backing for areas of development and methods of 
accountability that ranged from formal to informal. Principals see-
mingly had affective dissonance over working in for-profit school-
ing and there were issues surrounding the locus of ownership. 
There is little research in this area, particularly in Asia and this 
work appears to be the sole work that includes consideration of 
leadership in international school chains.
Introduction
There has been a significant rise in the number of schools describing themselves as 
international schools this century. With the number of international schools globally 
increasing by almost 40% between 2012 and 2018, and with projections that the number 
of students in international schools will reach 7 million by 2023 (ISC Research, 2019), 
understanding the world of international schooling is as significant to global education as 
understanding the education system of a medium-sized country like England (Bunnell 
et al., 2016). This rise has been predominately in Asia and the Middle East (Chuck, 2015).
Concomitantly, the nature of international schools seems to be changing. This growth 
has been accompanied by new forms of ownership and governance in international 
schools (Chuck, 2015). Additional changes in the composition of international schools 
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have also been noted. Previously international schools predominately served the children 
of expatriate families whilst now they contain a higher proportion of local host nation 
children (Hayden, 2011). The driving force behind this growth is frequently local 
population demand which makes a distinct difference from the traditional international 
school which were populated by overseas families (Chuck, 2015). Some theorists suggest 
changes in international schooling have created distinct types of international schools; 
for example, Gardner-mctaggart (2016, 2018) differentiates ‘international’ international 
schools serving an internationally mobile global elite from ‘local’ international schools 
serving upwardly mobile host national. By contrast, Hayden and Thompson (2013) 
create a typology of 3 based on cohorts and curricula, whilst James and Sheppard 
(2014) create four categories of international school governance based around the notion 
of fiscal profit. A common concern across these conflicting classifications is to capture 
a growing diversity in international schooling – in who attends such schools and in how 
they are managed and owned.
These changes render examination of governance relationships in international 
schools particularly pertinent. There is a limited literature in this area, suggesting that 
the lines between governance, ownership and management in international schools have 
frequently been blurred (Hayden, 2006). More recently, James and Sheppard (2014) 
indicate that the way international schools are governed has not been studied extensively 
to date and state that the ‘ownership basis is likely to influence decision-making, 
especially of a strategic nature and is therefore directly related to governance’ (James & 
Sheppard, 2014, p. 6). Previous literature has shown that issues relating to governance, 
ownership and management can lead to international school principal discontent. For 
example, Benson (2011) cites the relationship with the Board being the largest reason for 
principals leaving a school. Given that principal turnover in international schools is high, 
with Hawley (1994, 1995) calculating an average tenure of 2.8 years and Benson (2011) 
3.7 years, respectively, then it would appear valuable to focus on the principal governance 
relationship. Hayden (2006), James and Sheppard (2014), and Machin (2014) have 
explored these issues to some extent; however, both Hayden (2006) and James and 
Sheppard (2014) appear to concentrate on European and USA based International 
schools. The literature on leading international schools in Asia is low, Lee et al. (2012) 
finding only three studies that targeted international school leadership in Asia, conclud-
ing with a call for further such work. Although there has been an increase in published 
work since 2012, nonetheless such work is in its infancy. Machin’s (2014) work, like the 
current paper, is based in Asia although it primarily focuses the contestation around 
working in a for-profit school.
This paper contributes to the field by exploring principal perspectives on international 
school ownership in Malaysia which, like many Asian countries, has seen a rapid growth 
in international schools. It includes discussion of the leadership of schools with both 
single and chain ownership; an area that appears unexplored to date. The data analyzed 
here are 12 face-to-face interviews of international school principals, the schools having 
been sampled to include a range of ownership and governance models. In Malaysia, 
international schools are non-government funded fee-paying schools that deliver 
a foreign-based curriculum in a foreign language (predominately English) and are staffed, 
certainly at senior level, by foreign nationals. The titles given to staff in leadership roles in 
international schools vary, although most international schools have a single person in 
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a top leadership position (Keller, 2015). In Malaysia, the title used by the holder of such 
a post is almost exclusively ‘principal’, which will be used in this article.
Literature review
This review explores the extant work on international school ownership, governance and 
owner-principal relations. Governance is not an easy concept to define; Hodgson (2015, 
p. 8) defines governance as ‘the way in which organisations are directed, controlled and 
led’, drawing attention to rights and responsibilities, rules and procedures, monitoring 
performance and assignation of accountability. Examination of governance first needs to 
be set in context by analyzing the changing nature of international schools, their types, 
ownership and the nature of their cohorts.
The growth of international schools globally has been transformational (ISC 
Research, 2019); in 2000, there were approximately 2500 such schools whilst by 2017 
there were nearly 9000. The number of children attending international schools had 
risen from less than 1 million to 5 million over the same period, with a corresponding 
increase in staffing to nearly half a million staff. The nature of international schooling 
has fundamentally changed; in a space of 30 years, international school places have 
gone from 80% filled by expatriate children to 80% host national local children 
(Brummitt & Keeling, 2013). In 2000, the majority of international schools were in 
Europe and the US whilst by 2017, over half of the international schools were in Asia. 
The growth of international schools has also changed the ownership landscape so that 
the ratio of for-profit now outnumbers not-for-profit by around 2 to 1 globally. The 
majority of new international schools are set up by entrepreneurs and venture capital-
ists and may have shareholders concerned about financial return and are likely to view 
these schools as high-risk investment and therefore seek high returns (Chuck, 2015). As 
most international schools are fee-paying, in 2017 there was a global fee income of USD 
43b; this is education for many children and is big business. The market is forecast to 
double in the next 10 years (ISC Research, 2019), though as Machin (2017) points out, 
gold rushes rarely last forever. This raises the question of who benefits from this 
expansion – for example, who gains economic and cultural capital as a result of this 
process. We suggest that, in consequence, analyzing contested understandings of 
international schooling and its governance is not an academic exercise of marginal 
interest, but one infused with power and with macro effects. Changes in government 
policies toward international schools are leading to an implicit marketization of public 
systems of education in some Asian countries (Kim & Mobrand, 2019).
In Malaysia, the expansion of international schools has reflected these global trends. The 
number of international schools has grown rapidly since the government relaxed regula-
tions that prevented most Malaysians from attending international schools in 2012. By 
September 2018 there were 280 English medium schools in Malaysia, making it the largest 
sector in South East Asia and the 5th largest in the world, educating 100,000 students and 
employing 10,000 teaching staff (ISC Research, 2019). The Malaysian Government offi-
cially recognize 135 international schools (Ministry of Education Malaysia, 2018), defined 
as ones that deliver a foreign curriculum. This difference of numbers is explained by the 
ISC including all English medium schooling, some of which may well be language schools, 
although the ISC figure will actually exclude some non-English medium international 
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schools in Malaysia. The majority of these international schools were in the West 
Peninsula, and were concentrated in the capital city of Kuala Lumpur and the adjoining 
urban conglomeration of the Klang Valley (ISC Research, 2019). The 2012 changes also 
removed previous restrictions on foreign ownership of international schools, and there has 
been a consequent introduction of international chains into the Malaysian market.
Several theorists have attempted to make sense of this expanding market by offering 
typologies of international schooling. Two important works on this classification are 
Hayden and Thompson (2013) and James and Sheppard (2014); each is addressed in 
turn. Hayden and Thompson (2013) offer a threefold typology based around cohorts and 
curricula. Type A ‘traditional’ international schools typically offer an English or US 
curriculum to expatriate families and tend to be privately owned or run as parental 
cooperatives (Bunnell et al., 2016). The origins of international schooling also lie in part 
in Type B ‘Ideological’ International Schools, which aim to bring students together to 
foster a belief in world peace and develop international mindedness through their 
curriculum, for example, with the International Baccalaureate (IB) (Bunnell et al., 
2016; Hayden & Thompson, 2013). They suggest that the international school landscape 
has recently been ‘reconfigured’ (Bunnell et al., 2016) with the creation of Type C ‘Non- 
Traditional’ International Schools (Hayden & Thompson, 2013). Type C schools are ones 
that cater to host nation families, the economically advantaged who seek to give their 
children a social advantage and are the main growth area globally (Bunnell et al., 2016; 
Gardner-mctaggart, 2016). These schools usually are English medium and deliver an 
internationally recognized curriculum and qualifications that would assist students’ 
entrance to universities in the UK or the US for those who ‘perceive a western education 
and fluency in English as a route to future success and prosperity in a globalized world’ 
(Hayden & Thompson, 2013, p. 7). A significant distinction of Type C schools is that they 
tend to be privately owned and operated on a for-profit basis (Bunnell et al., 2016).
There are problems with Hayden and Thompson’s typology. Firstly, these are clearly 
simplifications, as international schools have always segued between the types. For 
instance, many Type C schools, serving local populations, offer the IB programs, or 
originally served expatriate populations until government restrictions on host country 
enrollment were relaxed. Equally, many international schools offer dual programs (a local 
curriculum alongside an international one). In addition, the Type B schools have also 
been subject to the criticism of Westernization, as their view of what it constitutes to be 
international seems to be grounded in the habitus of the Western elite (Tamatea et al., 
2008). Finally, some aspects of school climate are not captured by this typology; by 
contrast, Hatziconstantis and Kolympari (2021) differentiate between ‘inwards-looking’ 
(p. 6) international schools that celebrate existing cultures (either of host-country 
students or of the home cultures of expatriates), and cosmopolitan international schools. 
The expatriate/host nation binary division concept is problematic; increasingly these 
schools are marketing themselves internationally, attracting children from other Asian 
countries without their parents and may offer boarding facilities. To look at the nation-
alities of the children in the school does not tell you their story, they may be from 
expatriate families or be attending without their parents' resident in the country. 
Moreover, with some expatriate families not from the Western country where the 
school’s curriculum is sourced, the idea of an international school being a ‘home school 
not at home’ is not true for these children. Nevertheless, discussion about different types 
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of international school reflects a growing contestation of international schooling; this 
changing landscape of international schooling does not only concern a growth in sheer 
numbers but in addition changes in who they serve and who owns them.
The idea that international schooling is a contested and evolving construct has 
implications for governance and the professional working relationship between owner 
and principal. Privately owned schools could be for-profit or not-for-profit, for-profit 
schools operate on a commercial business where the product they are selling in the 
marketplace is ‘education’, not-for-profit schools are more like other social-based orga-
nizations like charities in that they are not focused on fiscal profit (Chuck, 2015). 
However, as James and Sheppard (2014) point out, this binary distinction is unclear, 
can evolve and may overlook personal financial gains made by individuals in ostensibly 
not-for-profit settings (James & Sheppard, 2014). The recent growth in international 
schools also includes the development of ‘chains’ of schools, whereby an owner owns 
multiple schools within a country or even across nations globally (Kim & Mobrand, 
2019). Hayden (2011) refers to the big international corporate players of Nord Anglia, 
Cognita and GEMS who manage schools in a range of countries, and the satellite 
campuses of prestigious private schools from the UK and US such as Harrow and 
Dulwich. These chains are also complemented by internal chains within one country, 
often owned within that country.
Nord Anglia Education’s 61 international schools are located in 28 countries across 
the Americas, Europe, China, Southeast Asia, India and the Middle East. It has relocated 
its HQ from Hong Kong back to its original London home (https://www.nordangliaedu 
cation.com/). Cognita is also UK based although its majority owner is Jacobs Holding 
AG, a global investment firm based in Switzerland. Cognita operates private schools in 
the UK and international schools in eight other countries in South America, Asia and 
Europe, with a total of 74 schools (https://www.cognita.com/). GEMS, founded as Global 
Education Management Systems (GEMS), is the largest operator of international school-
ing globally, with 98 schools in 12 countries in the Middle East, Europe, South East Asia, 
Africa and the USA. GEMS builds new international schools but also has a practice of 
acquisition of existing private schools, particularly in the UK (https://www.gemseduca 
tion.com/).
Asia has particularly seen the importing of English elite private education, with satellite 
colleges emerging as hyper-capitalism ventures of high-status schools such as Dulwich and 
Harrow – Harrow, for example, now operates Harrow International Schools in Bangkok, 
Beijing and Hong Kong. These international schools are usually operated as a franchise 
within the foreign country (Bunnell, 2008). This is a growth model with 72 such schools 
existing by July 2018, the largest increasing single year (https://www.tes.com/news/exclu 
sive-record-number-independent-schools-expand-overseas). As Machin (2014) succinctly 
puts it, ‘today, it is almost de rigueur for the great and the good of British (and increasingly 
American) private schools to loan their name, brand, iconography and imagery to locally 
financed, overseas outposts’ (Machin, 2014, p. 20).
James and Sheppard (2014) indicate that the way international schools are governed 
has not been studied extensively to date and create a categorization of international 
school governance based around ownership and fiscal profit and therefore differs from 
the Hayden & Thompson typology outlined earlier. International schools can be owned 
by a single owner or shareholders, this situation they describe as being in the private 
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ownership category. They can also be owned by a trust or foundation, these schools 
would be in the community ownership category. These two distinctions can then be 
further divided into those for-profit and those not-for-profit. Their study found inter-
national school principals in privately owned schools generally viewed the governing 
arrangements positively; this could be due to their reports of enjoying considerable 
autonomy over educational matters. The owners who participated stated that there was 
a high degree of autonomy given to principals in all but financial matters. The account-
ability of principals appeared to be gained through market-based mechanisms, for 
example, ‘student enrolments, examination results, periodic assessment by accrediting 
organizations and of course their own professional accountability’ (James & Sheppard, 
2014, p. 17).
There are two potential limitations of James and Sheppard (2014) work that have 
a bearing on the work reported here. The first is the nature of their sample. Although we 
do not know the location of the schools that participated, the sampling sites of confer-
ences in the US and Europe and a UK-based doctoral program may have inadvertently 
skewed the sample toward principals from these areas. The composition of the ownership 
categories may reflect this with private for-profit schools making up 11%, private not-for- 
profit 4%, community not-for-profit 86% and community for-profit 0%; the most 
common type of international school in Europe is the not-for-profit model whilst the for- 
profit is the most common in Asia (Chuck, 2015).
The second limitation in their study is the variance in the locus of control within 
governance and the concept of chain governance. James and Sheppard do not take 
account of the development of school chains in their model, probably as it is not reflected 
in their sample. The chain model of schooling brings complex governance models and in 
particular moves the location of the locus of control of ownership. If there is a single 
owner of a single school then the locus is within that school, whilst chains remove the 
locus exterior to the school. A group or chain may have other schools intra national (so 
the locus moves from the school but within the country) or even, trans national, where 
a school chain has developed and spread internationally but has an HQ in one country 
which may be different to the school (the locus is in another country). This locus shift 
may affect a principal’s professional working relationship with the Board. We offer this 
concept as additional thought in the fluidity of international school construction.
One particular finding in James and Sheppard’s study is that there is a potential 
problem with international school governance – the blurring of lines between governance 
and leadership and management (see also Hayden, 2006; Hodgson, 2015). Overzealous 
Board members may try to ‘micro manage’ the principal (Blandford & Shaw, 2001) and 
this occurs more frequently when there is a lack of Board training, few written policies 
and high Board member turnover (Hayden, 2006). This blurring of lines may be proble-
matic and occur more than in national schools (Hayden, 2006) although Walker (2004) 
believes the lines of distinction between management and governance are not strictly 
fixed.
These changes in patterns of ownership have important implications for the 
nature of international schooling and the leadership of international schools. For 
example, the cultural differences between principals and their host nation governors 
and staff are frequently referred to as part of the challenge of being a principal in an 
international school (Hayden, 2006; Sarros & Sarros, 2007; Terwilliger, 1972). 
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However, we hypothesize that this may become more marked as schools ownership 
becomes transnational, a principal could be dealing with a local host national 
representative of an owning organization based in yet a different country (for 
example, a Malaysian representing a UK-based organization to a South African 
principal in a school in Thailand). In addition, there is concern that cultural and 
linguistic diversity may be lost as global companies increasingly come to dominate 
education (Steketee, 2004).
The existent work on international school leadership in Asia does not address these 
critical concerns, however. Lee et al. (2012) discuss the challenges that face international 
school principals in Asia, although they restrict themselves to schools that use the 
International Baccalaureate curriculum. Their work, which includes schools from several 
Asian countries, does not address the principal owner/board relationship. More recent 
work that discusses the role of an international school principal in Asia does cite 
governance and the business elements as challenges and notes the wide-ranging models 
of governance in international schools (Bailey & Gibson, 2019). Nevertheless, the sole 
piece of work we have located that specifically discusses international school principal– 
owner relations in Asia is Machin (2014), where 3 of the 15 participants were from 
Malaysia (the others being in Thailand and China). However, the sample is described as 
‘principals and heads of school’; we are unclear what level of seniority they were. 
Nonetheless, Machin’s work provides us with an insight into the contested role of the 
principal in a for-profit school. Machin (2014) examines the colliding worlds of com-
merce and education within the role of a for-profit school principal. The language of 
markets may be familiar to many principals across the world, however for many inter-
national school principals such discourse is not only familiar but brings inherent tensions 
as ‘marketisation and the pursuit of revenue are not alien, unfamiliar and unwelcome 
concepts; they are, arguably at least, a central, if not the central, purpose for organiza-
tional existence’ (Machin, 2014, p. 20). International school principals are increasingly 
being asked to perform dual roles in protecting both educational standards and the 
commercial bottom line. Machin concludes that increasingly international school prin-
cipals need to be versed in the language of commerce.
In addition, there appears to be no academic literature that addresses principal–owner 
relations in chain-based international schools. The idea that schools could operate as 
groups with singular ‘branches’, i.e. schools, is a trend also occurring in state-funded 
schools in different parts of the world and there may well be parallels to international 
school chains. Academy schools in England, Charter schools in the US and free schools in 
Sweden are such models (Chapman, 2013). Academy schools in England often operate 
within a Multi-Academy Trust (MAT) governance model, where a single MAT may 
operate several schools throughout the country. Academies were introduced in 2000 and 
by 2016, there were some 1121 MATs running 4041 academy schools (Gibson, 2018). 
Gibson (2016) explored the relationship between academy school principals and their 
MAT. The study showed a continuum of principal autonomy from their MAT, ranging 
from ones that were autocratic to those being laissez-faire, with some MATs controlling 
the uniform, curriculum, staffing structure, building design, and teaching methods. 
Representatives from MAT companies described such control as building their ethos 
brand. It is useful to see whether international school principals face similar challenges 
when working in a chain of schools.
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This review has explored the changing landscape of international schooling and the 
effect that this has had upon ownership and governance. It has argued that typologies of 
international schooling have indicated the scope of such changes, but leave unanswered 
the question of whether and how such changes are shifting power relationships within 
international schools, and who gains from such changes. We have seen that there is 
a dearth of literature exploring the relationship between international school Boards and 
principals in the expanding international markets across Asia. This is an emerging trend 
and the literature has not yet kept pace with such changes. We have further argued that 
this has parallels to similar issues faced by autonomous schools within government 
systems of schooling. The remainder of this paper seeks to explore these issues in the 
context of Malaysia. This paper seeks to answer one overarching research question:
What are the challenges facing International school principals in the professional 
working relationships with their governors/owners in Malaysia?
Methods
The research that this article reports upon was a multiple case study. Case study has 
a strength in analyzing real-life situations (Yin, 2014), offering first-hand experience 
from participants who share their professional life, providing rich data. Case studies 
reflect the complexity of social truths and can provide deep insight (Cohen et al., 2018). 
However, a disadvantage of case study is that generalizations are problematic (Cohen 
et al., 2018). Our wider project was focused on understanding school leadership in 
international schools in Malaysia, and the significance of governance arrangements to 
principals emerged as a theme in the process of our research. This does not aim, there-
fore, to be a comprehensive examination of governance, as we do not consider other 
stakeholder perspectives. We offer our data as insight into an under-researched area and 
hope that it will be useful to inform the field.
The sample of principals interviewed was selected by a combination of opportunistic 
and purposeful sampling. A professional association of international schools in Malaysia 
distributed our call for participants, although we also contacted others. Snowballing 
increased the sample with some principals playing a part in recruiting others. There is 
a wide range of international school ownership in Malaysia, and we aimed to gain 
a selection across this diverse smorgasbord, rather than to obtain a representative sample. 
Our sample includes for-profit and not-for-profit schools, single owner schools, 
a parental cooperative and both intranational and transnational chains. In each school, 
we conducted an in-depth face-to-face interview with the most senior educational leader 
in the school, who was typically termed the ‘principal’. These interviews were all 
performed in 2018. We acknowledge that one limitation of this approach is findings 
may not be generalizable, but assert that they nevertheless offer insights into some of the 
challenges that principals face.
We sought to include principals from a range of different backgrounds; despite these 
efforts, none of the participants were Malaysian nationals, and it should be noted that 
they were predominately (but not exclusively) from Western countries such as the UK 
and the USA, and also predominately were White. This demographic feature of leader-
ship of international schools in Malaysia and its social meaning is explored in another 
paper we are publishing out of the same data-set, and there is no space to explore it here. 
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However, we acknowledge that the voices in this paper therefore largely constitute 
a Western perspective on international schooling in Malaysia. The language of instruc-
tion of all the schools was English and whilst the curriculum varied, it was invariably 
from Western countries. The participants’ mother tongue was English, and this was the 
medium of the interviews. Each participant was given a pseudonym to preserve anon-
ymity, although gender was preserved. The authors were acutely aware of the sensitivity 
of the research, involving, for example, participants commenting on their employer, 
therefore Table 1 contains the maximum detail about participants that we could ethically 
provide. We acknowledge that further demographic details would have helped to con-
textualize comments, but they could have compromised anonymity.
Findings and discussion
There were five emergent themes from the analysis: principal autonomy; ownership 
support; principal accountability; principal affective dissonance and the locus of control. 
This section will discuss each in turn; however, it will aid the reader to have a tabulation 
of the categorization of each participant with salient elements of their school. Table 1 
provides relevant information on each school arising from the literature review. We have 
been careful to preserve anonymity of participants, and this limits the ownership details 
that can be included.
It is noticeable that our sample is significantly different to James and Sheppard (2014), 
who had 86% of participants working in community not-for-profit schools and only 11% 
in a private for-profit school. In this study, the figures are essentially reversed with 3 out 
of the 12 being not-for-profit and 9 for-profit schools. Although the sample is not 
representative in any sampling method, it does reflect the ownership of international 
schools globally, particularly in Asia. The recent chain development of international 
schools is also reflected.
Theme 1 principal autonomy
We found considerable variation in the spheres deemed to lie within principals’ 
control, with areas traditionally delegated to principals, such as the curriculum, 
sometimes being seen as matters for Board control. In describing their working 
relationships with the Board the theme of autonomy was immediately raised by all 
participants; they felt that they had a high level of autonomy on educational matters 
like James and Sheppard’s participants, although in some cases the owners’ control 
was significant. Lisa’s summary, ‘the governors are strategic, I am operational’, was 
offered by several of our sample. The principals stated that they would be the person 
who hired and fired staff and had control of the curriculum, however, they frequently 
had close working relationships with a representative of the board. Bernard described 
how he felt he had a ‘huge degree of autonomy’ and his interview was peppered with 
‘I decided this’ or ‘I wanted this’, he felt that the trustees were not educationalists 
and placed a large amount of trust in him because they perceived the school as 
successful.
As experienced principals, Lisa and George established a clear demarcation between 
the governors and themselves upon taking up their posts. Lisa’s school was parent owned 
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and governed, and Lisa performed the governors’ orientation and training herself, 
thereby marking out her territory – the hidden agenda of the training was about power 
and where it resided. She also had conversations with potential governor candidates 
before they applied to explain the demarcation, ‘it’s explained to them even before they 
run for the board that this is their role and this is not their role’. George had a single 
private owner who also was a parent, and he described how he had established bound-
aries between the owner’s role and his own:
She was more hands-on in the past and I’ve actually helped her get out of the day-to-day 
stuff. And said, “this is my role, you be gone,” and we had a few choice words in the first 
week. But we managed to draw the lines and say, okay. Quite a bit of conflict in the first week 
or two and now we get on very well.
Mutual trust and negotiating skills appeared to be at the forefront of mapping the 
demarcation boundaries (Hayden, 2006). Jack explained:
We’ve spent a lot of time on this, in terms of where do the boundaries lie in terms of what is 
for the head of school . . . to deal with the operational aspects of the school, the day to day 
and then what is for governors to decide in terms of strategy, fiscal responsibility etc, and 
where is the overlap in those areas?
Autonomy is an emotive word for school principals, who are unlikely to admit to having 
little. In many schools, there were restrictions on the principal’s decision-making, despite 
the principals stating they had large autonomy. In some chains, things were dictated; for 
example, George’s single owner school had bought into a franchise that mandated 
a Reggio Emilia teaching approach, as well as the ‘uniform and business colors, the 
corporate aspects all centrally controlled from the franchise owners’. Isabella’s school was 
newly opened after the owners had spent considerable time undertaking market research 
into how to attract a certain parental group. A technology focus and the use of Singapore 
Mathematics curriculum was a market strategy directed from the owners, Isabella 
explained, ‘because that’s something the market . . . [chair of Board] is very committed 
to, you know. He thinks that it is a real draw for parents as well’. This control of the 
curriculum, often seen in the literature as part of a principal’s autonomous role (Hayden, 
2006; James & Sheppard, 2014), was centrally dictated by the owners in order to create 
a niche market. Similarly, in Henry’s school the decision to be an IT-based learning 
environment was taken before any principal appointment. Chains were seemingly 
searching for different markets in a competitive environment, and this creation of unique 
selling points for individual schools within a chain sometimes involved one school 
targeting a specific ethnic group in Malaysia. Two of the three schools with private single 
owners employed family members and this was another matter not open to principal 
negotiation. This wide range of principal autonomy within our sample was similar to 
Gibson’s (2016) findings in chain schools in England.
Theme 2 owner support
Support offered by owners was seen as important to principals, although the forms of 
support given differed according to school ownership type. All of the principals referred 
to the large amount of support they received from the owner/board. In the case of single- 
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owner schools, this support could manifest itself in personal encouragement. Amelia’s 
owner was ‘a mentor’ to her, this being her first principal post. George’s owner had an 
office in the school and was there almost daily. Amelia’s interview contained extensive 
praise for the owner, and principalship was clearly de facto a joint affair at the time of the 
interview. Several of our samples were new school builds within a chain that would not 
exist without the owners’ funding. Large amounts of capital were required to make 
Henry’s IT-focused school, and older schools had been renovated to ensure they retained 
their marketplace.
Operationally, chains sometimes provided mutual support from partner schools, for 
example, on curriculum development and teacher CPD. In all the chains, this mutual 
support was an explicit aim. In addition to these formal planned supportive mechanisms, 
principals reported ‘sounding out’ other principals before raising issues with the Board, 
each having a ‘go to’ person for mutual support. Support from governors for principals 
has been highlighted as a key ingredient for school success (Hayden, 2006).
Theme 3 principal accountability
There was a range of formal and informal principal appraisal mechanisms within our 
sample. Despite research-informed best practice indicating that regular fixed reviews of 
principal work should take place by the Board (Hayden, 2006; Hodgson, 2015), some of 
our sample had little, if any, formal review; Lily recalling, ‘I’ve never felt that I’ve had 
a formal, right I’m going to sit down and tell you what you’re good at and can’t do.’ Both 
Barry and Bernard had no appraisal procedures until they instigated them, providing the 
owners with development plans and specific targets for themselves.
The appraisal systems varied; in the case of one chain, it was a formal system operating 
across all the schools, involving tiers of management, chair of the Board and an annual 
parental questionnaire including questions specifically evaluating the principal. 
However, even when there was a formal system, in some schools, the primary focus 
was the business bottom line; numbers on roll. George explains his appraisal, ‘the ways 
things work at the moment it’s purely numbers [student roll], because they were con-
cerned with this . . . but I would think that my only KPI from this current round was 
based on numbers. So like once I reach 160 for the year, then I will get like a financial 
extra payment I think’.
Theme 4 principal affective dissonance
Working in international schools, particularly those which are for-profit, may pro-
voke moral dilemmas that participants had not faced in national schools in their 
home country. International schools source many of their teachers from other 
countries and this was a problem for Isabella, ‘but I need to say there isn’t a day, 
working 16 years in state schools, that I don’t feel guilty about taking good teachers 
out of the UK’.
Like Machin’s (2014) principals, the notion of working in a for-profit school also 
provided affective dissonance. It is notable that only a clarification of the status of the 
school was on the interview schedule, not how the participant felt about it, yet most 
discussed the ethics of for-profit schooling. The dialogue with James became one of 
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openly defending the concept of profit, ‘all schools are for profit, otherwise they wouldn’t 
exist. The question is what happens to the profit and I think that’s more of the identifier’. 
Others defended for-profit schooling by explaining the nature of their owners’ business 
interests. For example, Luke said:
We are for-profit but at the same time as an organization which is focused on education. The 
CEO talked about the education business or the business of education. And he said 
a number of times if we don’t get the education bit right, there’s no business. The other 
thing about [owner group] which is quite important is that it is a family business and so it’s 
not an organization which is looking to make lots of money very quickly.
Words such as ‘family’, ‘education business’ and ‘small’ were used by some of our 
participants to defend their company’s for-profit stance. This was openly contrasted 
with what they described as ‘big’, ‘corporate’ and being involved in other areas of 
commerce when describing some other international school owners, for whom they 
would be reluctant to work.
The organization that James worked for, however, was a large corporation,
We’re a part of a . . . Malaysian based group, and they have got branches which are involved 
in timber, and oil and gas, automotive, shipping, IT, they employ around 250, 000 people, 
it’s a massive group. And one branch of that is property and education was within property. 
They’re realizing now that education is a lucrative business to be in, so now, education is 
becoming a branch within itself, so we’ve come out of property.
James had seemingly bought into the big business of his employer and was proud of their 
business success; however, he defended his school profit by asserting that it was marginal 
to the business, ‘the profit that [the school] will make is equivalent to selling one house 
for example.‘ James here though is being selective in the business model. Frequently 
property developers cannot sell houses to families if there are no schools, so a developer 
may build a school too. The international school is almost a ‘loss leader’ in attracting 
home sales which are the bigger profit; the profit is just displaced. This business model of, 
in effect, subsiding school fees to increase profit on houses, was raised by other principals, 
who perceived such schools to have an unfair advantage in the market.
The affective dissonance surrounding working in a for-profit institution was also 
raised by those who worked in not-for-profit schools. Lisa had always consciously sought 
work only in a not-for-profit school and explained her strength of feeling about for-profit 
schooling, despite not working in one:
there are few schools in Malaysia that are not-for-profit . . . I think I would find it difficult in 
many many cases to work in [a for-profit] environment, . . . because resources are not spent 
for students, but rather the bottom line is making money.
During the interviews with participants in for-profit schools, the discourse of business 
featured, with their vocabulary frequently including ‘competition’, ’enrollment figures’, 
‘marketing’ and ‘market place’, and several participants seemed at ease with the ‘simul-
taneous educational–commercial discourse’ (Machin, 2014, p. 19). However, Henry 
clearly had affective dissonance with the nature of the business side of the role, being 
less than a year in post, observing ‘It’s more different than I ever imagined’. Henry’s 
reflections on leading a for-profit school underline the danger many principals felt: ‘I’d be 
in danger of losing that moral purpose. I’d be in danger of just saying all I really care 
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about is just having that 3% profit . . . Whereas, if I can keep reminding myself why I’m 
doing this. I’m doing this because I want to make a difference to kids‘.
The principals in this study, like those in Machin’s (2014), embraced the education- 
commerce plurality of their role. Their role became one of seeking and exploiting 
nuanced markets, all of the principals were very aware of the market their particular 
school was engaged with and who the ‘competition’ were. These markets were set by such 
parameters as fee-bracket and the curriculum offer. This education-commerce plurality 
created further role-tensions for them.
Theme 5 locus of control
Whilst the growth of international schools has diversified their governance models, 
unfortunately the literature does not appear to recognize the issues surrounding the 
locus of control. Both Hayden (2011) and Machin (2014) refer specifically to the growth 
of chains but do not address the peculiarities that this form of governance may bring for 
a given principal. In the situation of a single owner, the locus will reside inside that 
school, a unitary locus; chains within Malaysia will have an intranational locus; and those 
with a headquarters external to Malaysia, transnational. This concept may be important 
for international school principals in navigating their relationships with owners. It 
creates potential complexities for the international school principal, navigating 
a relationship with an owner who is in your school daily and may well have an office 
next to yours, is different to say one who resides in another country. This theme cuts 
across all of our samples which had unitary, intranational and transnational loci of 
control.
Two principals in our study were in unitary locus schools owned by individuals who 
employed various family members in the school, and one had the owner’s child as 
a pupil – all resulting in tensions. For example, in one case, family members would 
complain directly to the owner about issues that dissatisfied them in the school and the 
Board was made entirely of the owner’s family. The principal felt that one family member 
was not executing their job effectively but was unable to remove them from post. This 
direct intrusion of the owner into the daily life of the school was exemplified by a further 
principal who reported that the owner had instructed her on the types of clothes to wear 
to work.
Some of our sample were in intranational arrangements, whereby principals felt they 
had to solicit support for change within the organization (and hence their school) from 
other principals; a more political activity. Equally in one of our chains there was 
a demarcation in the aims of individual schools, to cater for different markets and so 
was beyond the scope for individual school principals.
The principal in the sole school that had transnational governance had little ownership 
contact; Lilly pointed out that ‘I have a regional support team in Vietnam because there 
are other schools in Southeast Asia. I have a regional director who’s my direct line 
manager . . . . He isn’t interested in the day-to-day running of the school at all . . . Now, if 
one month he came and numbers are dropped, results were terrible, he’d suddenly 
become very hands-on, very interested.’ By contrast, the principals who had a single 
owner sometimes received daily visits. These ownerships are also becoming more com-
plex; George, for example, felt that he had two ‘bosses’ in that he had the sole ‘owner’ of 
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the school who was regularly in the school, attending meetings of teachers with free rein 
to walk in and out of classrooms and a further ‘boss’ who was the company that the 
school was a franchise of. This parent company was based in another country but called 
George to meetings.
A more local locus of control may have benefits for principals in quick responses to 
urgent issues and being able to develop working relationships, the latter is of course 
a two-edge sword with potential tensions that may not exist with a more remote locus. 
George, for example, refers to heated arguments over establishing boundaries due to his 
concern over his perceived owner’s micromanagement of the school. However, 
a transnational locus appears to warrant management of principals by adherence to 
metrics. This is not a clear-cut pattern though, for example, Bernard, with a unitary locus, 
had little contact with his owner. Autonomy and accountability may be different in these 
situations, we offer some evidence here from our sample but further work is required for 
what is an increasing phenomenon.
This concept of locus of control and governance needs further exploration. We noted 
above that our sample of principals was predominantly Western; in other words, in 
schools with a locus of control outside Malaysia, cultural colonization might be a greater 
risk than in schools with a locus of control within the country, even if both are led by 
non-Malaysian principals. We highlight this as an important area for future research.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to explore the working relationships between owners and inter-
national school principals in Malaysia. The data here corroborate the findings of Hayden 
(2006), James and Sheppard (2014), Hodgson (2015), and Machin (2014) that the 
demarcation between educational leadership and governance may be blurred in interna-
tional schools. There were challenges for principals working with owners, particularly 
single-owner families and the lines between management, governance and ownership 
were blurred. We found five key areas of principal ownership challenges: principal 
autonomy; owner support; principal accountability; principal affective dissonance and 
the locus of control. However, our work also points to new issues that are under-
represented in the literature, such as international school principalship in chains, parti-
cularly the growth of transnational global actors and the concept of the locus of control. 
Principal autonomy varied across the sample; the ‘traditional’ area of principal control, 
the curriculum, for instance, was not within the remit of principals in certain interna-
tional school chains. All of the principals felt that they had support from their owners, 
though navigating relationship this was problematic when a single owner was in the 
school daily. Walking the ’tightrope’ of interpersonal relationships with owners was key 
for principals. Some of the principals had no formal accountability measures and the key 
theme across the sample was that student enrollment figures were paramount as an 
accountability measure; all had short fixed-term contracts. The affective dissonance that 
principals felt between their value and their employment was marked; for-profit school-
ing was not something with which all were comfortable.
These findings raise critical questions about whether/how the nature of international 
schooling is impacted by this contested relationship. We have noted that some principals 
expressed concern about the increasing encroachment of commercial concerns into 
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international schooling. We have also questioned the extent to which the locus of control 
of international schools was being detached from its cultural setting. These aspects of the 
role of principalship in international schools merit further research; we caution that this 
project had a sample of only 12 schools in one country and is therefore exploratory.
The nature of international schools is changing at a rapid pace. Both Hayden and 
Thompson (2013) typology of international schools, and James and Sheppard (2014) 
categorization of ownership, are problematic and further work is required in this area, 
particularly in the growth areas of Asia and the Middle East. We would caution that our 
findings suggest that models of ownership and leadership developed in Western contexts 
cannot easily be applied to other cultural and legal settings. The concept of international 
school chains is not recognized in James and Sheppard (2014) categorization of interna-
tional school governance. The chain concept brings different structures and tiers of 
governing and working professional relationships for an international school principal, 
one that merits further research. There are issues in this study that relate to the locus of 
control of ownership and how principals navigate it. The growth of school chains both in 
international schools and in a national setting is a pattern that poses questions over the 
nature of ownership, governance, leadership and consequently over the nature of the 
education provided. The growth in international schools is seemingly unchecked and we 
could perceive a situation where a not-for profit MAT from England operates for-profit 
international schools under a subsidiary. This growth is occurring at an alarming rate 
with the line between the public and the private becoming further blurred. These changes 
in the private sector have direct implications for inequalities in public education and for 
the relationship between schooling and citizenship (Kim & Mobrand, 2019).
In summary, the relationship between principalship and governance in the context of 
international schooling merits further investigation, and may suggest future patterns of 
change in principalship and governance in national settings. We could be observing the 
tremors heralding a global seismic change in the nature of school leadership and governance.
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